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Abstract
We explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty about the length of life and a lack of annuity markets for life cycle
consumption in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which markets are otherwise complete. Empirical studies
ﬁnd that consumption displays a hump shape over the life cycle. Our model exhibits life cycle consumption that is consistent with
this pattern. Our calibrated model, which includes an unfunded social security system, displays a hump shape but the peak occurs
later in the life cycle than in the data. Adding a bequest motive causes this decline to begin at a younger age.
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JEL classiﬁcation: E2; D91
Keywords: Life cycle consumption; General equilibrium; Annuity markets; Social security; Bequests
1. Introduction
Among the many sources of uncertainty that an individual faces when planning for consumption in old age, one of
the more signiﬁcant is uncertainty about how long the individual will live. This source of uncertainty could be easily
insured against if the individual were to purchase an annuity that provides a constant ﬂow of income until death. But,
annuity markets in the US are quite thin. A standard explanation for the lack of annuity markets is adverse selection—
those with long expected lifetimes will be attracted to annuities, which might cause them to be unattractively priced
for most people.1
In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty about the length of life and a lack of annuity
markets for life cycle consumption in a calibrated general equilibrium overlapping generations model where markets
are otherwise complete. A large literature has documented that individual household consumption increases early in
life, with a peak sometime around age 50 and a decline after that.2 This is generally regarded as posing a puzzle for
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1 See, for example, Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell et al. (1999).
2 Thurow (1969) is an early example from this empirical literature. More recent contributions include Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio
et al. (1999), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002). In addition, a recent paper by Aguiar and Hurst (2005)
argues that, while consumption expenditures may be hump shaped, home production is used to smooth actual consumption relative to expenditures.
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a standard life cycle model of consumption because, with complete markets, the model implies that consumption
should be smooth over a lifetime. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the household’s time discount rate and the
market interest rate, consumption can be constant, or monotonically decreasing or increasing as an individual ages.
If an annuity market (or its equivalent) is unavailable, this intuition no longer applies. If survival probabilities
decrease as an individual ages, individuals will more heavily discount the future as they grow older. This allows
for the possibility, depending on the value of the interest rate, that consumption might increase early in life when
survival probabilities are high and the effective rate of discount is low. As survival probabilities fall, the slope of the
consumption proﬁle may become negative.
Becausesocial securityprovidessomeinsuranceagainst uncertainlifetimesandmayprovideanadequatesubstitute
for missing annuity markets, we study the shape of the consumption proﬁle in a model with a pay-as-you-go social
security system as in the US. In this model, consumption peaks later in the life cycle in comparison to estimated
consumption proﬁles and a similar model that abstracts from social security. Introducing a joy of giving bequest
motive decreases the age of the hump in consumption.
We are not the ﬁrst to note the impact of annuity markets on consumption over the life cycle. Yaari (1965) is
perhaps the ﬁrst to study the impact of uncertain lifetime on the shape of the life cycle consumption proﬁle in an
overlapping generations model. Levhari and Mirman (1977) extend Yaari’s work by providing results on how risk
averse consumers respond to a change in the distribution of lifetime uncertainty. They obtain results showing how
uncertain lifetimes affect the level of consumption at a particular age, as opposed to how consumption changes over
the course of the life cycle. Barro and Friedman (1977) demonstrate in the context of a simple life cycle model that,
when perfect insurance markets are allowed, life cycle consumption under uncertain lifetime is the same as under
certainty.
Davies (1981) may be the ﬁrst to use a life cycle model with uncertain lifetimes to interpret actual consumption
and savings behavior, in particular the savings behavior of retired individuals. More recently, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al.
(1995) develop an applied general equilibrium model with long but randomly-lived households to study the welfare
effects of social security reform. They were able to generate age-consumption proﬁles with a hump by closing annuity
markets, though they also had individual income uncertainty and borrowing constraints. Bütler (2001) provides a
continuous-time overlapping generations model and gives an example of how a lack of annuity markets can yield a
hump-shaped consumption proﬁle. In this paper, our goal is to assess, using a calibrated general equilibrium model
with social security, the extent to which a lack of annuity markets by itself can account for the observed hump shaped
consumption proﬁle.3
Most of the consumption literature, however, has explored other factors that potentially play an important role
in determining how consumption changes over the life cycle. One possibility is that the hump shape may be due to
demographic factors–Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Attanasio et al. (1999) argue that the change in the size of
a household over time is a signiﬁcant determinant of the hump in consumption. However, more recent research has
generally found that demographic factors alone cannot account for the pattern of lifetime consumption.4
Thurow (1969), for example, suggested that the age-consumption proﬁle may be hump shaped due to borrow-
ing constraints. That is, individuals are prevented from shifting as much wealth as they would like from later in
life to ﬁnance consumption earlier. Another possibility is that individuals face income uncertainty and must die
with non-negative assets. This creates a motive for precautionary savings that could lead to consumption rising with
income early in life. Both Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) emphasize this point. Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger (2001) argue that households accumulate durables early in life as a way of insuring against
income uncertainty. In their model, the stock of durables provides insurance by acting as collateral for consumption
loans.
Heckman (1974) and Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003) explore the possibility that substitutability between con-
sumption and leisure, rather than market incompleteness, may play an important role. That is, if preferences are such
that consumption and leisure are substitutes, individuals may choose to consume more during the periods of their life
when they spend the largest fraction of their time engaged in market work.
3 A recent paper, Feigenbaum (2007), expands on the analysis presented in this paper by studying the role of mortality risk in a continuous time
life cycle model where labor supply is inelastic and households are borrowing constrained.
4 For example, compare the ﬁndings of Attanasio and Browning (1995) with those of Attanasio et al. (1999). The ﬁrst paper concludes that the
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The main ﬁnding of our paper is that consumption over the life cycle in our calibrated model displays a hump
shape, but the timing of the hump is different from what has been estimated from US data. In particular, in the model
economy, consumption peaks later in life than in the data and the ratio of peak consumption to age 25 consumption
is much larger. In the same calibration, if annuity markets were present, consumption would monotonically increase
throughout life.
To explore the robustness of this ﬁnding, we also consider cases with no social security and with a bequest motive
sufﬁciently large to account for the saving behavior of the elderly. Both of these changes cause consumption to peak
at an earlier age. However, even with the bequest motive, social security sufﬁciently substitutes for the lack of annuity
markets that consumption continues to increase until quite late in life.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys some of the empirical literature esti-
mating life cycle consumption proﬁles. From this we obtain some basic summary statistics that we can also compute
for our model economies. In the third section, we present a simple partial equilibrium model to provide intuition on
how a lack of annuity markets can deliver a hump-shaped consumption proﬁle. A general equilibrium model, one
that incorporates social security, is described in Section 4. In Section 5 we set up our quantitative exercise and present
results in Section 6. A bequest motive is introduced and its quantitative implications are studied in Section 7. Section 8
provides some concluding remarks.
2. Empirical consumption proﬁle
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), among others, have estimated life
cycle consumption proﬁles using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, shown in Fig. 1.
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) obtain a proﬁle for nondurable consumption expenditures of an adult
equivalent for ages 22 through 87. According to their estimates, consumption peaks at age 52 and the ratio of con-
sumption at this maximum to consumption at age 25 is equal to 1.29. We use these numbers as data benchmarks
with which to compare our model results because we abstract from durable consumption in our model. Also, their
estimation procedure controls for both family composition and cohort (growth) effects. We abstract from the ﬁrst in
our theoretical analysis, and, although we incorporate technological progress in our model, we also correct for growth
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in computing our theoretical consumption proﬁles. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), using a broader deﬁnition of con-
sumption, compute a household consumption proﬁle for ages 26 through 65. They ﬁnd that consumption peaks near
age 45 and the ratio of peak consumption to age 25 consumption is close to 1.12.5 This is consistent with Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger (2002) who ﬁnd that durable consumption peaks earlier than consumption of nondurables.
3. A simple partial equilibrium model
To clarify why a lack of annuity markets can lead to a hump shaped lifetime consumption proﬁle we ﬁrst study a
very simple endowment economy. Each period one agent is born that lives a maximum of I periods. Assume that the
lifetime endowment pattern is given by
yi =

1f o r i<I M,
0f o r i  IM
where IM is the mandatory retirement age. That is, individuals receive one unit of income in each period until they












ci +Λiai+1 = R(ai +b)+yi,i = 1,2,...,I,
a1 = 0.
Here ci is consumption of an age-i individual, ai is beginning of period asset holdings, yi is endowment income,
and sj is the conditional probability of surviving from age j to age j + 1. Non-annuitized assets of individuals who
die in a given period are distributed to all living individuals as a lump sum transfer b. The interest factor, R, is taken
parametrically in this partial equilibrium model. We allow for zero, partial or complete annuitization of wealth by
assuming a value for λ ∈[ 0,1], which is the fraction of assets that are annuitized. For a given value of λ, the savings
required of an individual who would like ai+1 assets available at the beginning of the following period is Λiai+1,
where Λi = 1−λ(1−si). This implies that
Λiai+1 = λsiai+1 +(1−λ)ai+1.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this expression is savings in the form of annuitized assets and the second
term is savings in the form of assets that are not annuitized. Note that si is the actuarially fair price for a one-period
annuity sold to an individual of age i.I fλ = 1, then there are complete annuity markets. As long as λ<1, there will











Given values for the model parameters and the interest factor R, it is straight forward to solve for the lifetime con-
sumption path that would be chosen by individuals in this economy. We assume that individuals start their economic
life at age 21 (corresponds to i = 1) and live to a maximum age of 100 (I = 80). They retire at age 65 (IM = 45). We
use survival probabilities published by the Social Security Administration for the cohort born in 1950.
In this case, the life cycle consumption-saving decision is determined by a sequence of Euler equations that can be
written as follows:
5 Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) measure consumption as quarterly expenditures on food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, utilities,
personal care, household operations, public transportation, gas and motor oil, and entertainment. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) use a broader
measure of consumption and consider all annual expenditures by a household except those for health care, mortgage interest and education. In
Fig. 1, we adjust for the differences in frequency and base year calculations.570 G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583
Fig. 2. Consumption proﬁles.







where the right-hand side reduces to βsiR in the absence of annuity markets and to βR when all assets are annuitized.
We are interested in determining how the consumption proﬁle depends on the value of λ and the value of the
interest factor R relative to the subjective discount factor β. Assuming β = 0.96, we ﬁrst consider a value of R such
that βR= 1. Fig. 2 shows the consumption proﬁle in this case for three values of λ:0 , 0.3, and 1.
One can see that, if there are perfect annuity markets (λ = 1), consumption will be constant over the individual’s
lifetime, which is also clear from the Euler equation, as the right hand side equals one in this case. If there are no
annuities available (λ = 0), individual consumption is declining over time. The intuition for this is that individuals,
because they face a probability of not surviving to enjoy the fruits of their savings, discount the future more heavilyG.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583 571
Fig. 4. Consumption proﬁles.
than if actuarially fair annuities are available. This ﬁnding is robust to allowing individuals to hold a substantial
amount of their saving in the form of annuities. For example if individuals annuitize thirty percent (λ = 0.3) of their
wealth at all ages, their consumption proﬁle is very similar to that in the case of no annuities.
If the consumption proﬁle is to be hump shaped, consumption must increase early in life. To illustrate this, we
choose R so that βR= 1.02. In this case, consumption would rise throughout life if individuals had access to perfect
annuity markets. This is because the price of the annuity, which is falling as an individual ages, compensates for the
increasing effective rate of discount due to survival probabilities falling as an individual ages.
A lack of annuity markets, however, means that individuals are not compensated for their increasing effective rate
of discount and consumption may decline in the later stages of life. This happens when an individual’s effective rate
of discount is larger than the interest rate. Fig. 3 shows the period-by-period trade-off that the individual faces in his
consumption-saving choice for β = 0.96 and R = 1.02/β. As long as the market discount factor given by the gross
real interest rate exceeds the subjective discount factor adjusted for the conditional survival probability of that age,
consumption grows. Once the reverse is true, consumption has reached its peak and starts to decline.
Fig. 4 illustrates consumption proﬁles when there are perfect annuity markets, when there are no annuities, and
when 30% of assets is annuitized.
4. A general equilibrium model
The preceding section provides the basic intuition about how missing annuity markets leads to a hump in consump-
tion.In thissection,we willdescribea fullycalibratedgeneralequilibriumlife cyclemodelofthesort studiedby Auer-
bachandKotlikoff(1987),˙ Imrohoro˘ gluetal.(1995),Ríos-Rull(1996),andFernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2001),
among others. Studying this issue in a general equilibrium setting is crucial because model features or institutions
(such as social security) will inﬂuence the consumption proﬁle through its effect on the interest rate.
4.1. The environment and demographics
We use a stationary overlapping generations setup. At each date t, a new generation of individuals is born and
the population growth rate is η. Individuals face long but random lives with a maximum possible age I. Lifespan
uncertainty is described by si, the conditional probability of surviving from age i to i + 1. We assume the survival
probabilities and the population growth rate are time-invariant.6 Total population is given by
6 For studies that examine the quantitative impact of time-variation in either demographic variable on social security reform, see Kotlikoff et al.







where Nt denotes the number of individuals born in period t. Given that we assume stationary demographics, the
fraction of the total population that is of age i is constant over time. These cohort shares, {μi}I










There is a representative ﬁrm with access to a constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas production function:
Yt = Kα
t (AtHt)1−α, (2)
where Kt and Ht are aggregate capital and labor inputs, respectively, and α is capital’s output share. There is exoge-
nous labor-augmenting technological growth at the rate g>0 :
At+1 = (1+g)At. (3)
The capital stock depreciates at the rate δ and follows the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1−δ)Kt +Xt, (4)
where Xt is aggregate investment in period t.
4.3. Households
Individuals differ by their date of retirement. There are M possible retirement dates (Im for m = 1,...,M) and
individuals know the date of their retirement at birth. The fraction of individuals with retirement date Im is denoted
by πm.















ci,m,t+i−1 +Λiai+1,m,t+i = Rt+i−1(ai,m,t+i−1 +bt+i−1)
+(1−τs)wt+i−1εihi,m,t+i−1 +Si,m,t+i−1, (6)
where β is the subjective discount factor, Rt+i−1 is the interest factor, τs is the social security payroll tax,S i,m,t+i−1
is the social security beneﬁt paid to an individual of age i and type m, ai+1,m,t+i is the amount of assets to be available
at age i+1,ε i is the efﬁciency weight of an individual at age i, and hi,m,t+i−1 is hours supplied by an age-i individual
of type m at time t +i −1. As in Section 3, we use λ ∈[ 0,1] to indicate the degree of completeness of private annuity
markets, and Λi = 1 − λ(1 − si). We assume that accidental bequests, if they exist, are returned to all surviving
individuals, regardless of age, in a lump sum denoted by bt+i−1.
Finally, we assume that all individuals are born with zero wealth and will exhaust all accumulated wealth at the
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4.4. Social security
There is an unfunded social security system in our economy. Beneﬁts are linked to average lifetime earnings in a
manner consistent with the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) computation. An individual born at date t receives




where Im is the retirement age for this individual and t +Im−1 is the date of retirement. To obtain the indexed annual
income (similar to the notion of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings calculated by the SSA), we need to multiply past
earnings up to the time of retirement by a ‘productivity factor’, with earnings that are in the more distant past getting
a higher factor. For an individual who retires at age Im at date t +Im −1, past earnings are scaled up so that the most
recent income before retirement (at date t + Im − 2) is multiplied by (1 + g)0, income from the period preceding
that one is multiplied by (1 + g)1, and so on, until the ﬁrst working age income for this individual, wtε1h1,m,t, is
multiplied by (1 + g)Im−2. Therefore, for an individual who retires at time t + Im, total indexed labor income over




Retirement beneﬁts for an age i individual who retires at age Im in date t +i−1 is a fraction θm of average lifetime





j=1 wt+j−1(1+g)Im−1−jεjhj,m,t+j−1 for i  Im,
0f o r i<I m.













to endogenously calculate the social security tax rate. In this formula, {πm}M
m=1 is the fraction of individuals who retire
at age Im.
Given that current labor market decisions affect future social security beneﬁts, an individual facing problem (5)–(6)
solves an intertemporal ﬁrst order condition for hours worked rather than the usual static ﬁrst order condition.
4.5. Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium with stationary demographics consists of a social security tax rate τs, and sequences
indexed by t for unintendedbequests bt, householdallocations {{ci,m,t,ai+1,m,t+1,hi,m,t}I
i=1}M
m=1, factor demands Kt
and Ht, and factor prices wt and Rt such that
1. The household allocation solves its maximization problem.
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3. Markets clear:













































In this section, we describe how we solve for the balanced growth path and the calibration of the model.
5.1. Solving for the steady-state equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium deﬁned above has the property that ci,m,t,a i,m,t,S i,m,t,K t, and wt, for all i and m,





Introducing this change of variables to the model enables us to solve for steady state values of {{ˆ ci,m,h i,m, ˆ ai+1,m,
 Si,m}I
i=1}M
m=1,  K,H, ˆ b, and prices  w and R. In particular, the life cycle proﬁles of consumption and hours described






Individuals are assumed to begin their economic life at age 21 (that is, i = 1 corresponds to age 21) and live until
a maximum age of 100 (i = 80). The conditional survival probabilities from age i to age i + 1, {si}I
i=1, are taken
from estimates provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA) for a cohort born in 1950 (see Bell and Miller,
2002).7 The population growth rate, η, is assumed to be 1.2 percent per year. The age speciﬁc efﬁciency weights for
labor hours, {εi}I
i=1, are based on estimates from Hansen (1993).
7 The survival probabilities used in the model are simple averages of the male and female survival rates in the life table. We assume that
householdsdonothavemoreinformationabouttheirmortalityriskthanwhatissummarizedinthelifetablesandthereforeabstractfromasymmetric
information as well as individual effort affecting survival probabilities. Both of these might be important features of a model in which a lack of




ﬁrst age i = 12 1
maximum age I = 80 100
population growth rate η 0.012
conditional survival probabilities {si}I




capital share parameter α 0.36
depreciation rate δ 0.047
productivity growth rate g 0.0165
Preferences
subjective discount factor β 0.9726
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ 1.0
share of consumption φ 0.368
Social Security Parameters (θ =  M
m=1θm/M = 0.45)
Im 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
πm 0.46 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05
θm 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65
Retirement can occur at M = 9 possible ages, which correspond to ages 62–70 (Im ∈{ 42,43,...,50}).8 The
fraction of individuals that retire and begin collecting social security at age Im, πm, was obtained from the SSA.9 In
addition,wecalculatedtheageadjustedsocialsecurityreplacementrate, θm,fromSSAdataonbeneﬁtsasapercentage
of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) by the age at which beneﬁts begin.10 In particular, we chose {θm}M
m=1 to be
consistent with these beneﬁt percentages, the fraction of individuals that retire at these ages, and the US average social
security replacement rate of 0.45.
Since the primary focus of this paper is on the role of annuities, as opposed to the role of nonseparable utility
studied in Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003), we set the risk aversion parameter, γ, equal to one in our benchmark
calibration. That is, the period utility function is separable, U(ci,hi) = φlogci +(1−φ)log(1−hi).
The remaining parameters of preferences and technology are chosen so that our model is consistent with various
facts characterizing the US macroeconomy. The growth rate of labor augmenting technological progress, g, is chosen
so that the model is consistent with the measured growth rate of real per capita income. Given this and the average
capital output (K/Y = 3.32) and investment output (X/Y = 0.25) ratios measured from US data, we obtain the





The capital share parameter, α, is set equal to 0.36, which is consistent with measures of capital’s share from NIPA
data. Finally, the preference parameters β and φ are chosen to target the capital–output ratio and the fraction of time
spent on market activities (taken to be 0.31).
Table 1 summarizes our calibration.
In alternative calibrations, we explore the relative impact of nonseparable utility in addition to lack of annuity
markets on the shape of the consumption proﬁle. Hence, we also consider cases where γ = 4 and γ = 7. This requires
8 In our model, the retirement age is the exogenously determined age at which individuals begin collecting social security and also stop working.
In the US economy, these two events do not need to coincide. French (2004) studies a life cycle model where labor participation and the date at
which social security payments begin are separate decisions made by utility maximizing individuals.
9 Age 62 is the ﬁrst age at which individuals are eligible to collect social security. By delaying, an individual will receive higher payments
(θm increases with m), but there is no incentive to delay beyond age 70. Hence, the fraction of individuals that begin collecting social security after
age 70 is trivial. The values we used for {πm}M
m=1 were obtained directly from Social Security Administration and are similar to numbers found in
Table 6B5 of the 2004 Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Administration.




γ = 1 0.9726 0.368
γ = 4 1.0127 0.380
γ = 7 1.0545 0.386
re-calibratingthe parameters β and φ in orderto hit ourtargets. Table2 summarizesthe valuesused in these alternative
calibrations. In particular, as γ is increased, β must be increased to achieve the target capital–output ratio, and φ
increased to match the fraction of time engaged in market activities.
6. Results
Here we describe consumption proﬁles for three model economies. The ﬁrst is our benchmark economy with social
security and no annuity markets. The second one is with complete annuity markets and no social security. The third
case has no annuity markets and no social security.
In each case, we consider three values for the risk aversion parameter, γ = 1, 4, and 7. The utility function is
separable between consumption and leisure when γ = 1, so leisure (retirement, in particular) has no effect on the
marginal utility of consumption. The other two cases involve non-separable utility, so changes over the life cycle in
the amount of time individuals spend working will also affect the shape of the consumption proﬁle.11 A summary of
our quantitative ﬁndings is contained in Table 3.
Table 3 reports various statistics including the three that were used to calibrate the model in Section 6.1: the
investment–output ratio, the capital–output ratio, and the average fraction of time spent working. Since we calibrated
the model under the assumptions of Case 1 (social security and no annuities), the results hit our targets exactly in this
case.12 In addition, we report the social security tax rate, the steady state interest rate, the age at which consumption
reaches its maximum, and the ratio of maximum consumption to age 25 consumption.13
Our main quantitative result is displayed in Fig. 5 (and the ﬁrst panel of Table 3) which also shows the consumption
proﬁle estimated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002). Consumption
from the model economies has been normalized so that the life cycle proﬁle has the same mean as the one estimated
Table 3
Quantitative ﬁndings
Data θτ s X/Y K/Y R H S1 S2
0.45 0.10 0.25 3.32 0.310 52 1.29
Case 1: Social Security and No Annuities
γ = 1 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 67 1.61
γ = 4 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 61 1.60
γ = 7 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 61 1.59
Case 2: No Social Security and Perfect Annuities
γ = 1 0.0 0.0 0.280 3.718 1.050 0.310 NA 1.34
γ = 4 0.0 0.0 0.300 3.979 1.044 0.318 59 1.34
γ = 7 0.0 0.0 0.309 4.103 1.041 0.323 59 1.39
Case 3: No Social Security and No Annuities
γ = 1 0.0 0.0 0.269 3.573 1.054 0.297 60 1.21
γ = 4 0.0 0.0 0.311 4.131 1.041 0.311 57 1.28
γ = 7 0.0 0.0 0.355 4.719 1.030 0.327 57 1.30
Notes. NA: the ratio is still rising at maximum attainable age. S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum. S2 is the ratio of
maximum consumption to consumption at age 25.
11 The effect of this non-separability on consumption proﬁles is studied in Heckman (1974) and Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003).
12 Note that, as shown in Table 2, we have different calibrated parameters depending on the value of γ.
13 Note that the social security tax rate that maintains the pay as you go system in Case 1 is close to the actual social security tax rate of about 10%.G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583 577
Fig. 5. Social security and no annuity markets.
Fig. 6. No social security and perfect annuities.
from actual data. In an economy with social security but no annuity markets, consumption peaks later than that in the
data and the ratio of maximum consumption to age 25 consumption is too large. In the ﬁgure, we also see an upward
sloping proﬁle after retirement (except for the γ = 1 case) that we do not see in actual data.
To better understand how the model works, we consider Case 2, which has perfect annuity markets and no social
security. In this case, consumption proﬁles are hump shaped only when utility is non-separable. Fig. 6 shows that578 G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583
Fig. 7. No social security and no annuity markets.
consumption monotonically increases throughout life in the γ = 1 case. This reﬂects the fact that for our calibrated
capital–output ratio the equilibrium interest rate is higher than the subjective discount rate. In the other two proﬁles
shown, consumption peaks at about age 59 and then rises again after retirement (consumption peaks at age 52 in the
data). This is very different from what is observed in actual data.
When public and private annuities are shut down simultaneously, all consumption proﬁles have a hump shape (see
Fig. 7). The intuition for why a hump is observed in the γ = 1 case is the same as was discussed in Section 3; the
effective rate of discount that combines the subjective rate of discount and the unconditional probability of survival
eventually exceeds the market rate of discount measured by the interest rate. We interpret this counterfactual case as
indicating that if there were no access to annuities whatsoever, life cycle uncertainty might account substantially for
the hump in consumption estimated in the data. This conclusion is reinforced by our robustness experiments that we
describe in Section 6.1.
Our model also has implications for the life cycle proﬁle of hours worked. It turns out that the hours proﬁles are
very similar in all the cases considered, so we only show the proﬁles for the benchmark economy with no annuity
markets and social security in Fig. 8. These proﬁles are almost completely determined by the efﬁciency weights and
by our retirement assumptions. Annuity markets, or lack thereof, have essentially no impact on the shape of the hours
proﬁle.
6.1. Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of our results on the lack of annuity markets, we relax the discipline imposed by
our calibration procedure. In particular, we solve the model for a wide range of plausible parameter values without
targeting a particular capital–output ratio, investment–output ratio, or fraction of time spent on market activities. We
create a discrete grid for each parameter as shown in Table 4 and solve our model for all parameter combinations on
these grids.
In Table 5 we summarize our ﬁndings regarding the shape of the steady state life cycle consumption proﬁle. We
report the minimum and maximum values for the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum (S1) over
all parameter combinations considered. In addition, we report the corresponding ranges of values for the ratio of
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Fig. 8. Hours proﬁle, social security and no annuity markets.
Table 4
Parameter space for robustness check
Parameter Min value Max value Increment
γ 143
β 0.98 1.02 0.01
δ 0.03 0.09 0.02
α 0.30 0.40 0.02
φ 0.30 0.40 0.02
Table 5
Results of robustness check
Case minS1 S2 maxS1 S2
Social security, γ = 16 0 1 .21 74 2.54–2.74
Social security, γ = 45 7 1 .34 61 1.51–1.78
No social security, γ = 12 2 1 .09–1.10 70 1.92–1.99
No social security, γ = 43 7 1 .16 0 1 .49
Notes. S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum (S1 = 52 in data). S2 is the ratio
of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25 (S2 = 1.29 in data).
This exercise reinforces the ﬁndings from our calibrated model. If one ignores the existence of social security, a
life cycle model with no annuity markets appears to account for the key quantitative properties of consumption over
the life cycle. However, when social security is present, consumption is predicted to peak too late in life and the size
of the hump in consumption is too large.
7. Bequests
The results of the previous section indicate that, while a lack of annuity markets causes consumption to be hump
shaped over the life cycle, consumption appears to peak quite a bit later than empirical studies have found.580 G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583
Another problem with these results is that older households are not saving as much (holding as many assets) as
they do in the data. For example, for the benchmark case in Table 3 with social security and no annuities (γ = 1),
the ratio of assets held by individuals age 75 and older to average wealth is 0.69. But according to Table 702 of the
Statistical Abstract of the United States (2006), this ratio is around 1.75.14 Clearly, our model is inconsistent with the
saving behavior of older households.15
There are a variety of reasons why older households might save more than they do in our model economy. While
we have taken into account uncertainty about longevity, we have not taken into account uncertainty about medical
expenditures or that individuals may care about their descendants. In this section, we will introduce a “joy of giving”















where U and V are increasing, concave and differentiable functions. The function V captures the bequest motive. The
intertemporal ﬁrst order condition can be written as
U (ci) = β





If V  (a) = 0, the slope of the consumption proﬁle depends on the value of si relative to βR (see discussion in
Section 3). If V  (a) > 0, then there is an additional value of saving that will cause households to delay consumption
(the consumption proﬁle will have a positive slope) even for a range of values of si that are less than 1/(Rβ). Hence,
for a given interest factor and sequence of survival probabilities, it would appear that the introduction of a bequest
motive will delay the peak of the life cycle consumption proﬁle. Since the puzzle remaining from Section 6 is that
consumption in our model peaks too late in life, it would appear that a bequest motive is not going to help us resolve
this anomaly.
However, ours is a general equilibrium model. The interest rate is not exogenous and will fall if we hold all other
parameters constant and introduce a bequest motive that increases savings and, hence, the capital stock. The general
equilibrium effect comes from a reduction in the interest factor as the capital stock increases with a more intense
bequest motive.
In our numerical exercise, we calibrate the model by choosing β to deliver a particular capital–output ratio. With a
bequest motive, we will require a smaller value of β to achieve our target. Hence, the condition si < 1/(βR) will be
satisﬁed at an earlier age since survival probabilities fall as an individual ages. Whether or not this general equilibrium
effect dominates the effect described above can only be determined through a numerical exercise. We describe this
exercise and the results obtained in the next subsection.
7.1. A simpliﬁed model with a bequest motive
We will consider a simpliﬁed version of our model in order to understand the role of bequests in affecting the
consumption proﬁle. In particular, we restrict our attention to log utility, one retirement type, and exogenous labor.














14 These wealth ratios are computed using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance.
15 This ratio is somewhat sensitive to the timing of bequests. In the experiments reported in Table 3, bequests, which are all accidental, are paid
in lump sum fashion to all living households. If we assume that bequests are paid uniformly only to individuals of age 52–58, which are the ages
most individuals receive bequests in the US, the ratio of assets held by individuals age 75 and older to average wealth is 0.87 rather than 0.69.
16 We calibrate the bequest motive to account for all saving by the elderly, so we are exaggerating the importance of this particular motive.
17 The inclusion of a bequest motive presents computational difﬁculties in characterizing steady-state equilibria especially when the bequest
motive is very strong. To deal with this problem, we simpliﬁed the model in all the dimensions that we could but retained the crucial features.G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583 581
subject to
ci,t+i−1 +ai+1,t+i = Rt+i−1(ai,t+i−1 +bi,t+i−1)+(1−τs)wt+i−1εi +Si,t+i−1,
where ψ>0 is a parameter that represents the intensity of the ‘bequest’ motive. Conditional on survival, individuals
begin collecting social security beneﬁts at age IR:
Si,t+i−1 =





j=1 (1+g)IR−j−1wt+j−1εj for i = IR,IR+1,...,I,







Factor prices are the same as in Section 4 with H =
IR−1
i=1 μiεi. We will present our ﬁndings for two cases,
with and without social security. In both cases, we set η = 0.012,g= 0.0165, and α = 0.36 as before, and target
K/Y = 3.32 and I/Y = 0.25 (which together imply δ = 0.047 as before). We calibrate the bequest motive (ψ) so
that the ratio of assets held by households aged 75 and older to the total capital stock is equal to 1.78. This choice
of ψ, however, is likely to be an upper bound because there are many additional reasons that will induce households
to keep a large level of assets late in their life cycle such as the illiquidity of the housing markets, the risk of out-of-
pocket medical expenses, etc. Also, we assume that both accidental and intentional bequests are received as lump sum
transfers by all households between ages 52 and 58 (see footnote 15).
7.2. Results with social security
Setting the replacement rate θ = 0.45, a subjective discount rate of β = 0.9672 and an intensity of bequest ψ =
3.80 allow us to obtain K/Y = 3.32 and S3 = 1.78. Table 6 reports the quantitative general equilibrium ﬁndings.
This case is analogous to the case shown in Table 3 for Case 1, γ = 1 and differs from this case only because of the
simpliﬁcations we have made to the model and the different timing of accidental bequests. As in Table 3, the results
shown in the ﬁrst row of Table 6 indicate that consumption peaks at a late age (70) when there is no bequest motive.
The introduction of a bequest motive calibrated to S3 = 1.78, however, does not have much of an effect on the age at
which consumption peaks (68 as opposed to 70). Introducing a bequest motive does not appear to overturn our main
ﬁndings from Section 6, that the partial annuity provided by social security causes the peak in consumption to appear
Table 6
Timing of the hump: with social security
ψR K / Y S 1 S2 S3
(calibrated with ψ = 0)
0 1.0619 3.32 70 1.90 1.02
(calibrated to S3 = 1.78)
0 1.0715 3.05 70 1.90 1.11
1 1.0682 3.14 69 1.81 1.37
2 1.0658 3.20 69 1.76 1.54
3 1.0636 3.27 69 1.71 1.69
3.8 1.0619 3.32 68 1.68 1.78
5 1.0592 3.40 67 1.64 1.90
8 1.0532 3.61 60 1.57 2.12
10 1.0496 3.74 57 1.55 2.20
15 1.0418 4.07 55 1.52 2.32
Notes. S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum. S2 is the ratio of maximum
consumption to consumption at age 25. S3 is the share of wealth held by households aged 75 and older.582 G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583
Table 7
Timing of the hump: no social security
ψR K / YS 1 S2 S3
(calibrated with ψ = 0)
0 1.0619 3.32 64 1.34 1.42
(calibrated to S3)
0 1.0762 2.93 65 1.41 1.59
1 1.0711 3.06 61 1.43 1.55
2 1.0686 3.12 59 1.42 1.61
3 1.0663 3.19 56 1.41 1.68
4 1.0640 3.25 55 1.41 1.73
5 1.0619 3.32 54 1.40 1.78
10 1.0525 3.63 53 1.40 1.93
15 1.0451 3.93 53 1.39 2.00
Notes. S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum. S2 is the ratio of maximum
consumption to consumption at age 25. S3 is the share of wealth held by households aged 75 and older.
too late in the life cycle relative to empirical ﬁndings. This conclusion could, however, be reversed with a stronger
bequest motive and a much larger share of wealth being held by households aged 75 or older.18
The remaining lines of Table 6 show that, if all other parameters are held constant, increasing ψ increases the
capital-output ratio and the fraction of the capital stock held by the elderly, and decreases the interest factor. Increas-
ing ψ also reduces the age at which consumption peaks and slightly decreases the size of the hump (S2).
7.3. Results without Social Security
In the previous subsection we found that adding a bequest motive had relatively little impact on the timing of the
hump in consumption over the life cycle. Table 7 reports our ﬁndings when we consider an economy without social
security. In this case, we set β = 0.9562 and ψ = 5 to hit our calibration targets. Now, a much more dramatic effect is
found. In particular, the age at which consumption attains its maximum falls from 64 to 54.
8. Concluding remarks
The empirical life cycle consumption proﬁle in the US has a hump that peaks around age 50. This is typically con-
sidered a puzzle since the complete markets life cycle model would produce a consumption proﬁle that is monotonic
over the life cycle. In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty about the length of life and a
lack of annuity markets for life cycle consumption in a calibrated general equilibrium life cycle model where markets
are otherwise complete. In addition, since social security may substitute for missing annuity markets, we introduce an
unfunded social security system in our model.
If an annuity market (or a partial substitute) is unavailable, then the decline in the survival probabilities over the
life cycle as an individual ages leads to a heavier discounting of the future as they grow older. This allows for the
possibility, depending on the value of the interest rate, that consumption might increase early in life when survival
probabilities are high and the effective rate of discount is low. As survival probabilities fall, the slope of the consump-
tion proﬁle may become negative.
In our calibrated model, if complete annuity markets exist, consumption would increase over the entire life cy-
cle. When the annuity market is shut down, consumption displays a hump shape where consumption peaks well
before retirement. Social security, since it substitutes for the missing annuity market, causes consumption to continue
increasing until after retirement, although consumption still displays a hump shape. In particular, the consumption
proﬁle displayed by our model peaks signiﬁcantly later than what has been estimated from US consumption data. We
18 One could argue that an S3 = 1.78 is too low on the grounds that this ratio does not take into account the smaller household size in older
households. Using a typical equivalence scale to adjust the family size in households that are 75 and above, S3 becomes 2.50. Keeping α = 0.36
and θ = 0.45, the (new) joint targets of K/Y = 3.32 and S3 = 2.50 are obtained with β = 0.9487 and ψ = 12. Now, the hump occurs at age 56
and S2 is 1.67. So we need a strong preference for bequests and high asset holdings by the elderly to get the hump in the presence of social security.G.D. Hansen, S. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu / Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 566–583 583
ﬁnd that these conclusions are robust to the introduction of a bequest motive calibrated to account for the fraction of
wealth held by the elderly, although consumption now peaks at a somewhat lower age.
We ﬁnd that a lack of annuity markets is quantitatively important for life cycle consumption, but this feature by
itself cannot account for the estimated life cycle proﬁles. Other factors, such as borrowing constraints and income
uncertainty, must also be important.
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